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Abstract 
Tests of behavioral insights have become increasingly more common, and have been 
deployed by UK government and agencies. Typically these field experiments aim to 
change individual-level behaviors. The current paper tests the potential of behavioral 
insights for changing group-level behavior. This paper reports the results of a field 
experiment carried out with the Department of Communities and Local Government. 
The field experiment tested whether a normative message (vs. a neutral or no 
message) could encourage parish councils to register an asset of community value 
(social action). There was no statistically significant effect from this intervention, but 
the process of designing and implementing this field experiment shows the potential 
for theories of behavior change to be used by government departments.  
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A Field Experiment: Testing the Potential of Norms for Achieving Behavior Change 
in English Parishes 
Behavioral Insights Revolution  
In recent years there has been considerable official interest in the use of 
behavioral insights to inform public policy. Policy-makers are starting to take 
advantage of the wealth of behavioral research from across areas of psychology, 
economics, and other social sciences, which has been popularized in recent years (see 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Behavioral insights (or nudge) is a term that is increasingly 
used and understood across disciplines as well as by lay-people. Behavioral insights 
typically consist of low-cost strategies that aim to change behavior. The years since 
2010 have seen central government departments and agencies in the UK and 
elsewhere using behavioral insights to complement conventional policy tools (i.e., 
legislation, regulation, incentives) and to enhance policy outcomes (see Dolan et al., 
2012). Examples of behavioral insights interventions that were first tested using 
experimental designs in the field and then rolled out to improve public policy include 
using tax reminders to collect taxes and using SMS texts to collect court fines 
(Halpern, 2015).  
Governments have always sought to influence human behavior and such an 
interest goes back to recruiting for armies and getting citizens to pay their taxes, core 
functions of government. The study of human behavior influenced the emergence of 
central regulation in the nineteenth century, such as the rise of public health 
legislation and regulation, and continued in the twentieth as government became more 
professionalized and responsive to specialist knowledge, such as measures to prevent 
traffic accidents. However, the greater focus on behavior change as a key objective of 
government emerged more strongly in the twenty-first century following on from the 
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academic advances in the social sciences. Central government in the UK has taken a 
great interest in this agenda and it has influenced central government discussion 
documents (e.g. Halpern, Bates, Mulgan, & Aldridge, 2004). But the visibility of 
behavioral sciences increased markedly with the publication of Nudge (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). Most prominent has been the emergence of the Behavioral Insights 
Team (BIT), established in 2010 under the United Kingdom Coalition government, 
which succeeded in gaining public attention and a measure of success, and was spun 
out of government as an independent organization (Halpern, 2015). Key has been the 
use of the randomized controlled trials (or field experiments) as a way to test the 
effectiveness of these behavioral interventions in the field (Haynes, Service, 
Goldacre, & Torgerson, 2012; John, 2013). These interventions have been done on 
standard operating procedures of government and on new policies, which are intended 
to show the potential for a greater roll out. 
Influencing Organization-Level Behavior 
The current research will examine the potential of behavioral insights for 
influencing organization-level behavior among parish councils. This is a particularly 
important research endeavor for several reasons. First, while ample research (both in 
the laboratory and in the field) has examined the effects of behavioral insights on 
individual-level behavior, much less is known about whether and how behavioral 
insights may affect group-level behavior. Indeed, in spite of the diffusion of 
behavioral insights practices and the greater use of scientific knowledge, English local 
and parish councils have experienced fewer of these behavioral insights interventions. 
It seems likely that organization-level behavior may be harder, or at least more 
complex, to influence than individual-level citizen behavior. Indeed, action from the 
organization is dependent on the decision-making structure within the organization. 
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Parish-level decision making processes vary but they will typically involve 
discussions among a group of elected members supported by the permanent office, the 
parish clerk. Moreover, some parishes seek input through meetings of all residents, 
and/or contact with local interest groups. In other words, such organization-level 
action may be subject to the decision of veto players in the organization or may suffer 
from implementation loss through chains of command or simple failure of collective 
action. Nevertheless, organizations are headed by individuals who can respond to 
behavioral cues. There are examples of the use of behavioral interventions directed to 
organizations in the less developed context, such as encouraging the standing of 
women in village councils in India (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) or linking aid to 
performance with local providers in India (Olken, Onishi, & Wong, 2014). In the UK, 
behavioral interventions targeted at businesses, such as Growth Vouchers, show how 
policy-makers can seek to influence organizations (Department for Business and 
Skills and Cabinet Office 2014). 
Second, given that UK governments elected since 2010 have given a particular 
emphasis to the philosophy of localism, which implies a hand-off approach to local 
government (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012), novel strategies need to be developed and 
tested to help advance knowledge and ensure better implementation of policies among 
local government organizations. Effective behavioral insights interventions might be 
seen as consistent with the localism agenda as such interventions do not use the 
authority of the state to command local authorities but instead indirectly encourage 
behaviors.  
In sum, the current research aims to contribute to the literature by testing the 
effectiveness of a behavioral insights intervention for influencing group-level (rather 
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than individual-level) behavior in a relevant applied context (i.e., among parish 
councils).  
Use of Descriptive Norms 
In this experiment, we draw on the behavioral insights concept of social norms 
(see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), which has become the tool of choice of today’s 
behavioral policy-makers. Social norms can be understood as socially shared 
definitions of the way people do behave or should behave (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004). Research on normative theory has suggested that two types of social norms 
exist – descriptive and injunctive (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). Descriptive norms are those that “characterize the perception of 
what most people do” (Cialdini et al., 1991, p. 203). In contrast, injunctive norms are 
those that “characterize the perception of what most people approve or disapprove 
[of]” (Cialdini et al., 1991; p. 203). For example, the statement “nine out of ten people 
pay their tax on time” would be a descriptive norm. In contrast, the statement “nine 
out of ten people think that people should pay their tax on time” would be an 
injunctive norm.  
People are heavily influenced both by what other people do and by what other 
people think they should do. Social norms offer a standard from which people do not 
want to deviate as they do not want to risk social exclusion from their group (Schultz 
et al., 2007). Therefore, an effective strategy for mobilizing people to act is to 
publicize the desired social norm. This strategy is a very well validated in the 
psychology and economics literatures and has become a popular tool among policy-
makers to encourage compliance (Dolan et al., 2012).  
Empirical evidence suggests that social norms can mobilize people to act. 
Indeed, research has drawn on social norms to change socially important behaviors 
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such as alcohol consumption, drug use, disordered eating, gambling, littering, and 
recycling (e.g., Donaldson, Graham, & Hansen, 1994; Larimer & Neighbors, 2003; 
Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004; Schultz, 1999; Schultz, Tabanico, & Rendon, 
2008; see also Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). For 
example, one experiment tested whether different types of messages could improve 
the reuse of towels in hotel rooms. A sign that asked guests to reuse towels in order to 
save the environment led to 37% of people doing so. A sign that highlighted that most 
other guests in the hotel reused their towel more than once led to 44% of people 
reusing their towels. A sign that highlighted that most occupants of the same room 
reused their towels more than once led to 49% of people reusing their towels 
(Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Therefore highlighting a social norm 
significantly increased pro-environmental behavior in a field experiment.  
The Current Research 
Drawing on and extending Goldstein et al.’s field experiment (2008), the 
current research focuses on the potential of descriptive norms for encouraging parish 
councils to act. Our reasoning for employing a descriptive norm rather than an 
injunctive norm intervention was as follows. Ample research shows a consistent 
relationship between group membership and social identification on the one hand and 
conformity to injunctive social norms on the other (e.g., Abrams, Palmer, Rutland, 
Cameron, & Van de Vyver, 2014; Terry & Hogg, 1996). In the current experiment, 
the norm intervention would be distributed by central government (Department for 
Communities and Local Government) to local governments (parish councils). Based 
on the literature, it seems unlikely that an injunctive norm message disseminated by a 
higher-status outgroup would successfully promote behavioral compliance. Indeed, 
parishes may read an injunctive norm message and think “what do they know about 
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our beliefs”? In contrast, it would be reasonable to expect central government 
departments to hold statistical data on parish-level asset listings. Therefore, in the 
current experiment we employ a descriptive rather than injunctive norm intervention.   
Specifically, in the current research we explore whether a descriptive norm 
message (vs. a neutral message or no message) can increase parish councils’ uptake of 
community rights policies, in particular the Community Right to Bid (introduced in 
2011; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011). The community 
right to bid gives parish councils and community groups the power to protect any 
local building or land by nominating it as “an asset of community value”. A building 
or land in the parish area must be listed as an asset of community value if current 
primary use of the building/land or use of the building/land in the recent past furthers 
the social well-being or social interests (cultural, recreational, or sporting interests) of 
the local community. The advantages of nominating a community asset, if the 
nomination is accepted by the local authority, are that (1) the parish council (or 
community group) will be notified if the asset is ever put up for sale; (2) the parish 
council (or community group) will have the opportunity to buy it if they wish to do 
so; (3) a signal is sent to the owner making them aware that the asset is valued by the 
community; and (4) the nomination could be taken into consideration by planning 
authorities when considering planning applications (see Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2015). During the development stage of this study, 1002 
community assets (e.g., community halls, pubs) were listed across the UK.   
In the current experiment parish council clerks were sent either an e-mail 
depicting the descriptive norm, an identical e-mail but without the descriptive norm, 
or no e-mail at all. While parish council clerks are responsible for implementing the 
council’s decisions, they do not have inherent powers to make any decisions 
NORMS AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE  9 
 
(Communities Parish and Local Councils, 2017). Therefore, we expect that parish 
council clerks would share the intervention email with the council members, who 
would then discuss how to proceed. Parish council’s uptake of community rights (i.e., 
asset nomination) was monitored. Based on past research (e.g., Schultz et al., 2007), it 
is hypothesized that asset nomination will be higher among those who viewed the 
descriptive norms message than among those who viewed the neutral message or 
among those who received no message at all. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that 
asset nomination will be higher among those who viewed the neutral message than 
among those who received no message at all. This is because, while unlike the 
experimental norm-Condition there is no motivational incentive, the neutral message 
provides parishes with easy, accessible, and necessary information about the 
community right. Indeed, research suggests that while motivational incentive is 
important for behavioral change, so is capability and opportunity (i.e., knowledge and 
resources) (see Michie, van Stralen, & West, 2011).    
Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 3,026 parish councils from all regions in England 
except for London (see Online Supplemental Materials for a full breakdown of the 
sample by regions, counties, and local authorities). The sampling strategy involved 
scanning the web for open-access contact details (e-mail addresses) of parish councils 
- typically accessed via Local Authority webpages. The sample was therefore 
restricted by public availability of parish council contact information. The mean 
precept size (i.e., parish income from taxes paid by residents within the parish area) 
for this sample was £27, 599.61 (SE = 924.22). Precept size ranged from £48 to £801, 
462. Twenty-nine per cent of parishes in this sample had a precept of less than £5,000 
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(vs. 34 % of parishes across England). Ninety-three per cent of parishes in this sample 
had a precept of less than £100,000 (like 90 % of parishes across England; 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014).  
Design and Stimuli 
Parishes were randomly assigned to Condition in a one factor between 
participants design with three levels (Message: norms, neutral, none).1 The norm and 
neutral messages were distributed via e-mail (using Mailchimp, a web-based e-mail 
marketing application). The e-mails were sent by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government. Messages (including message headers) were kept identical 
across Conditions. Titles within the e-mail varied by Condition (see Table 1 for a 
depiction, see also Online Supplemental Materials).  
Randomization. In order to randomly allocate parish councils to one of the 
three Conditions, block randomization was employed. Block randomization 
(randomizing within subgroups) ensured (1) a relatively equal number of small versus 
large parishes (in terms of precept size) and (2) a relatively equal number of parishes 
with (vs. without) assets already listed across the three Conditions.  
A phenomenon that became apparent while retrieving parish councils’ contact 
details was that parish councils sometimes shared the same clerk (i.e., administrator) 
with other parish councils (25.4% of the parish councils in the dataset shared a clerk 
with at least one other parish council). Therefore, in the current experiment, one 
parish council was randomly selected per clerk. However, while only one parish per 
clerk was randomly assigned to Condition, the behavior of all parishes will be 
analyzed. It is highly likely that the clerk would share the information with all of the 
parish councilors who they work with. This inclusion of the duplicate clerks in the 
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analyses increases the sample size and therefore the statistical power of the 
experiment.2  
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Table 1 
Message Headers and Titles 
Condition E-mail header E-mail title 
1.No e-mail N/A N/A 
2.Neutral e-mail 
 
Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
3. Norm e-mail Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
Parishes and local groups all 
over the country are 
nominating community 
assets. 
Over 1000 assets have 
already been listed. 
 
Measures 
Outcomes were measured in two ways: (1) monitoring e-mail activity; and (2) 
monitoring community asset listings.  
Interest in listing an asset. Mailchimp software was used to send out the 
neutral and norm messages. Mailchimp is able to monitor whether parish councils 
clicked on the link for further information given at the end of the e-mail (see Online 
Supplemental Materials). This offers some insight into whether the norm message 
generated greater, lesser, or equal interest in listing a community asset (vs. the neutral 
message). No reminder e-mail was sent. 
Asset listings (behavioral outcome). We monitored whether parish councils 
listed community assets (offering behavioral data). Listings were monitored via 
inspecting local authority webpages. Listings made prior to the intervention (i.e., prior 
to April 2014) will be referred to as Time 1 listings. Listings made between April and 
August 2014 will be referred to as Time 2 listings. Due to the nature of the 
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collaboration with DCLG, only data up to August 2014 were available for analyses. 
Nevertheless, the four-month period seemed a reasonable length of time to allow 
parish councils to nominate assets of community value. 
Parish precept size. In the analyses below we include parish precept size as 
an additional independent variable. Parish precept size is publicly available 
information which we matched with our experimental data. We include precept size in 
the analyses because a parish council’s financial capacity may reasonably moderate 
their capability of responding to the intervention. Due to a particularly strong positive 
skew of precept size (skew = 5.49, SE = .06), this variable was log transformed (ln) 
prior to entering it as a linear predictor in the regression analyses reported below. For 
the mixed model analyses of variance reported in the results section below, we 
categorized precept size into equally distributed categories of low (M = 3152.03, SD = 
1396.70), medium (M = 9788.88, SD = 3111.24), and high (M = 60,170.98, SD = 
68,834.61) precept income.  
Covariates. We also collated information about: (1) geographical area of the 
parish council and (2) whether a community asset was already listed in the boundaries 
of the parish council. These two variables will be used as covariates in the analyses on 
the grounds that areas vary considerably across England and that prior listing might 
affect responsiveness.  
Results 
For the norm and neutral Conditions, data analyses were restricted to those 
who opened the e-mail, and therefore to only those who were exposed to Condition. 
In the norms condition 437 (43.8%) parish councils opened the e-mail. In the neutral 
condition 433 (43.4%) parish councils opened the e-mail.  
Interest in Listing an Asset 
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Statistical analyses of the Mailchimp data were conducted three weeks after 
the e-mails were sent. Binary logistic regression was conducted to examine whether 
Condition (norms message vs. neutral message) predicted whether or not parish 
councils clicked on the link for further information. Region of parish, asset listed, and 
precept size were also entered into the model as predictors.  
Results showed that Condition did not significantly predict whether parishes 
clicked on the link for further information (B = -.22, SE = 0.26, p = .397, ExpB = .80). 
Precept size was the only significant predictor (B = .32, SE = 0.11, p = .002, ExpB = 
1.38). Specifically, the greater the precept size, the more likely parishes were to click 
on the link for further information. 
Asset Listings (Behavioral Outcome)  
Whether a new asset was listed. An analysis of variance was conducted to 
test the effect of Condition (norm message vs. neutral message vs. no message) and 
Precept Size (low, medium, high) on whether a new asset was listed (0 = no, 1 = yes). 
The analysis controlled for region of parish. Results revealed no significant main 
effects of Condition, F (2, 2408) = 0.64, p = .529, η2 = .001 or of Precept Size, F (1, 
2408) = 1.41, p = .244, η2 = .001. There was also no significant Condition x Precept 
Size interaction, F (4, 2408) = 0.64, p = .634, η2 = .001 (see Table 2) 
Number of assets listed. A mixed model analysis of variance was conducted 
to test the effect of Condition and of Precept Size on the number of assets listed at 
Time 1 versus at Time 2. We employed a 2 (Time: number of assets listed at Time 1 
vs. number of assets listed at Time 2) x 3 (Condition: norm message vs. neutral 
message vs. no message) x 3 (Precept Size: low vs. medium vs. high) design with the 
first factor being a within participants factor and the second and third factors being a 
between participants factors. The analysis controlled for region of parish.  
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Results revealed no significant main effect of Time, F (1, 2408) = 0.16, p = 
.693, η2 < .001 or of Condition, F (2, 2408) = 0.96, p = .385, η2 = .001. There was a 
significant main effect of Precept Size, F (2, 2408) = 8.78, p < .001, η2 = .01. 
Furthermore, there were no significant Time x Condition interaction, F (2, 2408) = 
0.50, p = .606, η2 < .001, Condition x Precept Size interaction, F (2, 2408) = 0.62, p = 
.651, η2 = .001, or Condition x Precept x Time interaction, F (4, 2408) = 1.18, p = 
.318, η2 = .0023 (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Errors for the Effect of Condition on Assets Listed 








 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Norms message .04 (.01) .07 (.02) .13 (.03) 
Neutral message .04 (.01) .05 (.02) .09 (.03) 
No message .03 (.01) .07 (.01) .13 (.02) 
Note. “Whether new asset listed” ranged from 0 = no new asset listed to 1 = new asset 
listed, therefore the means can be interpreted as proportions.  “Assets listed at Time 
1” reflected the number of assets listed at Time 1 and ranged from 0 to 9. “Assets 
listed at Time 2” reflected the number of assets listed at Time 2 and ranged from 0 to 
15. 
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Discussion 
This field experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of a behavioral 
insights technique (i.e., norms) to encourage parish councils to use the Community 
Right to Bid (i.e., to nominate assets of community value). The results showed that 
there was no significant effect of Condition (norms message vs. neutral message vs. 
no message) on assets listed at a four-month follow-up.  
 Overall the experiment showed how the behavioral sciences can be adapted to 
seek behavior change in the decentralized context with a valid methodology. The 
nudge approach was light-touch and consistent with a hands-off approach to 
implementing policies in the locality. The results highlight the importance of 
experimentally testing the effectiveness of behavioral insights techniques before 
further roll out. Indeed, the effectiveness of behavioral insights techniques will 
depend on context, audience, methodology, and many other factors. Therefore, it is 
essential for policy makers to work with researchers to conduct controlled field 
experiments prior to investing substantial time and money in such initiatives. 
The non-significance of the findings could have occurred for many reasons. 
First, it is possible that the descriptive norm intervention simply was not effective at 
motivating behavioral change. However, given the substantial amount of prior 
evidence to the contrary (e.g., Donaldson et al., 1994; Larimer & Neighbors, 2003; 
Neighbors et al., 2004; Schultz, 1999; Schultz et al., 2008; see also Schultz et al., 
2007) this explanation seems unlikely, or at least insufficient. Second, it is possible 
that organization-level behavior is more difficult to influence than individual-level 
behavior due to decision-making structures within the organization or implementation 
loss through chains of command. Third, it is possible that local parishes are resistant 
to encouragements from the centre. Fourth, the non-significant effect of our 
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intervention may have occurred due to the over-dispersion of our asset data. 
Nevertheless, re-analyzing the data using negative binomial regression (O’Hara & 
Kotze, 2010) continued to produce a non-significant effect of the intervention on asset 
listings3. Finally, it is possible that perceived procedural barriers reduced uptake 
(rather than a lack of motivation). Indeed, a separate follow-up survey among parishes 
showed that the most frequently listed barriers to listing an asset of community value 
were: expected cost, time required, and lack of specialized advice. In sum, conducting 
a behavioral insight’s experiment in an applied setting with a hugely diverse 
population is challenging. However, we hope that this paper highlights the importance 
of evaluating the effectiveness of applied social psychological interventions. Indeed, 
the discrepancy between our findings and previously published research shows that 
the impact of descriptive norms interventions on behavioral change varies by the 
specific context.  
This field experiment had some limitations, which is inherent to any 
intervention of this nature. One such issue was the availability of the asset nomination 
data. Specifically, parish councils’ asset nominations needed approval by the local 
council in order to be successfully listed. Given that we were interested in parish 
councils’ behavioral change, we were interested in their nominations. Nevertheless, 
the dependent variable in the analyses reflected successful listings rather than 
nominations. This was due to data availability restrictions. Analyzing the successful 
listings (rather than nominations) means that (1) we cannot be certain that a 
nomination was not made before the intervention occurred, and (2) we cannot be 
certain that unsuccessful (or delayed) nominations were not made following the 
intervention. Nevertheless, the random assignment to groups helps attenuate these 
issues. The key suggestion for future research in this particular field is to conduct a 
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similar field experiment but over a longer period of time. This would ensure more 
accuracy in the asset listing data. It would also be interesting to explore the effects of 
different behavioral insights techniques. Due to the sample size we were only able to 
test one behavioral insights technique, but it is very plausible that other behavioral 
insight techniques could be more effective as compared to the descriptive norm 
technique employed in the current experiment. Finally, it would be interesting to 
explore whether longer-term or repeated exposure to the behavioral insights 
message(s) would be more effective than a one-off exposure. As local parish and 
town councils become more important and better known by central government, it 
may be possible to craft other light-touch interventions that communicate government 
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Footnotes 
1 E-mails were sent out on Wednesday 9th and Thursday 10th April 2014. Due to 
a procedural error using Mailchimp the neutral messages were sent out 24 hours before 
the norm messages. This was not intended and we appreciate that this means allocation 
of Condition is no longer entirely random but influenced by time.  However, we think 
it unlikely that one day’s difference would make a difference to the impact of the 
treatment. 
2 The results do not differ significantly by whether the duplicate clerks were 
included or excluded.  
3 Given the non-normal distribution of the variable, we analyzed the data using 
two alternative analyses. Specifically, consistent with the asset listings results reported 
above, analyzing the data using log-transformed asset counts or using negative binomial 
regression similarly showed non-significant effects of Condition on asset listings. 
Results available on request   
 
